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Beyond Blakely
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Federal criminal sentencing in the wake of Blakely v.
Washington3 is, to put it charitably, a mess. In holding that Blakelys sentence under the Washington State
Sentencing Guidelines was imposed in a manner inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the
decision threatens the operation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the presumptive sentencing systems in
fourteen states. 4 In Parts I and II of this article, we address
how Blakely has affected the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and how assistant U.S. attorneys, federal public
defenders, and district and appellate court judges might
proceed in a post-Blakely world. In Part III, we discuss
Blakely challenges raised in cases on direct and collateral
review. Finally, in Part IV, we collect some of the various
options for reform open to Congress.
Blakely was the latest in a series of decisions defining
when a fact used in setting an offender's sentence must
be treated as an element under the Constitution. In the
most important of these cases, Apprendi v. New Jersey,5 a
closely divided Court declared that "any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum [other than the fact of a prior conviction] must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."6 Two years later, the four justices who dissented in
Apprendi, joined by Justice Scalia, held in Harrisv.United
States7 that Apprendi did not require a fact triggering a
mandatory minimum sentence to be established beyond
a reasonable doubt to a jury.' That same term, the Court
in Ring v. Arizona 9 applied Apprendi to hold that because
Arizona conditioned eligibility for the death penalty upon
the presence of an aggravating fact that was not an element
of first degree murder, the Sixth Amendment guaranteed
the defendant a right to a jury determination of that fact.
The Court stated, "[i]f a state makes an increase in a
defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the
finding of fact, that fact - no matter how the state labels
it - must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."',
Blakely presented the Court with another variation
of the Apprendi problem - this one posed by a state
sentencing scheme that included what might be called
dueling maximum sentence statutes. The statute setting the sentence ranges for each class of felony offense
in Washington designated ten years as the maximum
punishment for Blakelys class B kidnapping offense.
Washington's Sentencing Reform Act," however, specified in a separate statutory provision a "standard range" of

49 to 53 months for Blakely's offense, a range that could
not be exceeded unless a judge found a "substantial and
compelling reason" justifying an exceptional sentence.
The Act enumerated several potential factors that would
support a judge's decision to depart from the presumptive range, but provided that the list was not exclusive.
The trial judge in Blakely's case imposed an exceptional
sentence of 90 months, after finding that Blakely had
acted with "deliberate cruelty," an enumerated factor for
an exceptional sentence. With Justice Scalia writing for
five justices, the Court concluded that because a sentence
higher than 53 months required additional factual findings not admitted by the defendant nor proven beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury as part of his conviction, the
relevant "statutory maximum" for Blakely's offense was
the 53-month presumptive sentence and not the ten-year
maximum specified for class B offenses. Any fact triggering a sentence exceeding 53 months, the Court reasoned,
must be admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.

I. Blakely's Application to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines
A. Are the U.S.S.G. Distinguishable?
The Court in Blakely v. Washington addressed only the
Washington Sentencing Reform Act. Justice Scalia's
opinion stated that the Court was not expressing an opinion on the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines." The dissenters, plainly unconvinced, predicted the Washington sentencing scheme could not be
3
distinguished from the Guidelines."
The position of the Department of Justice 4 is that even
if facts required to exceed presumptive ranges must be
treated as elements under the statutes in Washington,
the same is not true for facts that must be established for
upward adjustments or departures under the Guidelines.
Washington's dueling sentence maxima for Blakelys
offense were both codified in statutes; Congress has
enacted only a single sentence maximum for each crime,
contained in the U.S. Code. The federal guidelines are not
"legislatively enacted," but are rather a "unique product
of a special delegation of authority" to an independent
Commission in the judicial branch.' The Guidelines
"were never intended to operate on the same footing as
the statutory maximums. ,6
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This distinction, which rests upon whether or not
a legislature first delegates the creation of presumptive
sentence ranges to a commission before endorsing them,
is unlikely to accepted by the five member majority in
Blakely.'7 Every sentencing guideline promulgated by the
Commission must be ratified by Congress, which "can
revoke or amend any or all of the Guidelines as it sees
fit.""' Congress has invoked its authority to reject guideline
amendments promulgated by the Sentencing Commission, and to bypass the Commission altogether and amend
the Guidelines directly. ' 9 Just as the presumptive sentencing range for the offense of conviction with no additional
facts is the "statutory maximum" in Washington after
Blakely, so the top of the recommended sentence range
as determined by the offense of conviction, without any
upward adjustments, is the "statutory maximum" in the
federal system. In both statutory schemes, the maximum
sentence available is "the maximum [the judge] may impose without any additional findings."- ° Several district
courts, now joined by decisions from the Seventh and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, agree."' The Fifth Circuit
has taken the opposite position, holding that "Blakely does
not extend to the federal Guidelines."" That opinion is
based not upon any meaningful distinction between the
Washington and federal sentencing schemes, but on the
panel's refusal to reject various prior Supreme Court cases
that upheld the federal sentencing guidelines against constitutional challenges, albeit not a Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial challenge" 3 The Sixth Circuit is reviewing en
banc a panel decision which held that Blakely returns the
federal system to an indeterminate sentencing regime,
such that the district judge "should view the guidelines in
general as recommendations to be considered and then
applied only if the judge believes they are appropriate
24
and in the interests of justice in the particular case."
Finally, the Second Circuit has certified this question to
the United States Supreme Court. 5
B. If the Guidelines are Indistinguishable, What
Features of the Guidelines are Affected?
Assuming that the presumptive sentence ranges established by the Federal Guidelines cannot be meaningfully
distinguished from those in Washington State, which
factual assessments must be proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt? Consider one illustration. Suppose a
defendant is convicted of mail fraud, in violation of i8
U.S.C. § 1341. Assume also that only the elements of§ 1341
simpliciter (knowing creation of a scheme to defraud, with
specific intent, and a mailing) are admitted or otherwise
proven at a jury trial., 6 The sentence provided in § 1341 is
7
o-2o years for simple mail fraud. Congress has also provided, via its adoption of U.S.S.G. § 2Bi.i, a presumptive
sentence of o-6 months for this offense, absent additional
factual findings." Before Blakely, judges assumed they
were free to find those facts that trigger sentences under
the Guidelines that exceeded 6 months, so long as the
sentence did not exceed 20 years. So, for example, a judge
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would impose a sentence of 4 i-5I months, if she found as
part of sentencing that the fraud involved losses exceeding
$i million."9 After Blakely, however, the relevant "statutory maximum" that the judge "may impose without any
additional findings" 3 is the top of the range designated
for the offense of conviction alone, o-6 months. Any
additional finding triggering a higher range, such as the
million dollar loss, must be either admitted or proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, if the prosecutor or
judge wishes to aggravate a defendant's sentence due to
his role in the offense, the presence of a gun, injury, 3 or
relevant conduct,3 or seeks to depart upward from the
presumptive sentencing range due to a fact not otherwise
taken into account under the Guidelines," each of those
additional facts must be admitted by the defendant or
found by a jury before a sentence higher than six months
4
can be imposed.'
We also believe that Blakelyhas thrown into doubt those
decisions authorizing judges to make findings necessary
for forfeiture and restitution awards." These cases have
reasoned that Apprendi does not apply to factfinding in
determining what assets, if any, can be forfeited because
the forfeiture and restitution statutes do not create a
penalty ceiling. This argument has rested in turn on the
assumption that the statutory maximum under which
a judge was free to sentence based on specific findings
of fact was the maximum sentence codified into the
U.S. Code, an assumption that we believe Blakely has now
undercut. Instead, because judges may not order forfeiture
of defendant's assets without specific factual findings that
are not always part of the underlying conviction, these
facts must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. 6 Restitution ordered as part of sentencing is open
37
to the same sort of attack.
Still, much of the Guidelines scheme is not directly
affected by the Blakely rationale. Facts allowing judges to
mitigate a defendant's sentence, or that trigger a higher
minimum without raising the maximum sentence, may
be found by the judge using the preponderance of evidence
standard. Prior convictions, too, need not be submitted
to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. There
are quite a number of enhancements based upon prior
convictions. 3 After Blakely, the government will have a
much higher procedural burden to meet before it can
advance up through the offense levels on the vertical axis
of the sentencing grid, but it can in many cases zip along
39
the horizontal axis as easily as it did before.

C. Severability: Can the Guidelines Stand
As Modified?
Assuming that Blakely has invalidated the judicial factfinding we have detailed above, the question for courts is
whether the remainder of Congress's sentencing scheme
should be retained, or rather, whether the entire statutory
scheme must be invalidated. This may prove to be not
only the most important, but the most difficult issue to

SENTENCING

REPORTER • VOL.

16, NO. 5 • JUNE 2004

resolve in assessing the impact of Blakely in the federal
courts.4"

1. The Test for Severability
The United States Supreme Court has often repeated
that it "should refrain from invalidating more of the
statute than is necessary... '[W]henever an act of Congress
contains unobjectionable provisions separable from those
found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this Court to
so declare, and to maintain the act in so far as it is valid.'"'
The Court has explained that "[u]nless it is evident that
[the Legislature] would not have enacted those provisions
that are within its power, independently of that which is
not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully
operative as a law." 4" This is a test of legislative intent; "the
unconstitutional provision must be severed unless the
statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress
would not have enacted." 43 The absence of a severability
clause, as is true of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 44
4
"does not raise a presumption against severability." 1
There is no obvious answer to the hypothetical question
- would Congress have enacted the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 had it known that the sections permitting
judges rather than juries to find enhancements would
be stricken as unconstitutional? Looking to the history,
purpose, and structure of the Federal Sentencing Reform
Act, there are persuasive arguments on each side.
2. Gutting the Guidelines
The Government's position is that if Blakely applies to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines at all, the Guidelines
as a whole no longer have the force of law, because judicial
fact-finding cannot be severed from the remainder of the
statutory scheme.46 The Department argues quite credibly
that a "requirement that enhancing - but not reducingfacts have to be submitted to the jury and proven beyond
a reasonable doubt would distort the operation of the
sentencing system in a manner that would not have been
47
intended by Congress or the Sentencing Commission."
Congress clearly intended that the Guidelines would be
applied by judges and not juries, 48 and appellate review
of jury findings were not envisioned by Congress in
enacting 18 U.S.C. § 374 2(d). Applying Blakely undercuts
the Guidelines effort to end sentencing disparity and many
enhancements, particularly relevant conduct, grouping,
and post-trial conduct are "not well-suited to submission
to juries." 49 The Commissioners themselves noted in the
Manual that "the Guidelines Manual in effect on a date
shall be applied in its entirety," 5 and this was implicitly
5
adopted by Congress in 1987. 1
Joining this side of the debate is Professor Frank
Bowman in his Memorandum to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, three days after Blakely was decided.'"
Bowman argues that Blakely renders the Guidelines facially unconstitutional. The complex federal sentencing
model envisioned by Congress includes post-conviction
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findings of various facts by district judges; any attempt
to salvage the Guidelines by treating those facts as elements would be '"transforming them by judicial fiat into
something that neither the Sentencing Commission nor
5
Congress ever contemplated that they would become."
Some judges are reaching this result already. In one
of the earliest decisions applying Blakely, the District
Judge in United States v. Croxford54 held that "the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional and cannot
govern defendant's Croxford's sentencing." 55 The judge
found that Blakely barred a two level enhancement for
obstruction of justice based on defendant's fleeing the
jurisdiction before trial, and another two level increase
based on an uncharged sexual offense involving another
young victim. The probation officer's recommendation
had included these adjustments, as well as a three level
decrease for acceptance of responsibility, for an adjusted
level of 34 (i1-I8i months), slightly higher than the range
contemplated in the plea agreement of iI-I5I months. 6
The judge concluded that imposing only the sentence
authorized by the Guidelines without the addition for
obstruction of justice and relevant conduct "would inevitably tug downward on criminal sentences, perhaps
producing sentences that do not provide just punishment
or protect public safety." 57 Using his pre-Guidelines discretion bound only by the io-year mandatory minimum
and 2o-year statutory maximum, the judge sentenced the
defendant to 148 months. 5 He noted that "should the
sentencing guidelines later be found to be constitutional
... the court will impose a backup sentence under the
Guidelines of i5i months. "59 Other judges, too, have
found the Guidelines were invalidated by Blakely and are
sentencing accordingly.6"
Blakely flies in the face of Congressional intent to
retain judicial fact-finding in sentencing proceedings,
and creates procedural barriers where Congress would
not have erected them. The decision operates to distort
what were otherwise even-handed restraints on judicial
discretion, so that after Blakely reducing a presumptive
range becomes much easier than raising it. Moreover,
Blakely makes it much more difficult to achieve a key
compbnent of Congress's sentencing scheme - real
offense sentencing, in which conduct other than the
offense of conviction carries a specified sentencing price.6'

3. Preserving the Guidelines, as Modified
What makes the issue of severability a dose one is
that despite Blakely's dear repudiation of Congressional
intent to provide for a real-offense sentencing system
with judicially-based upward as well as downward adjustments, much of what Congress was trying to accomplish
in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 is untouched by
Blakely. The Sentencing Reform Act was the result of
overwhelming bipartisan support for ending disparities
that occur at sentencing or at the parole stage.6" Every
player in the criminal justice system prior to 1984 had
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horror stories about identical offenders before different
judges, one who received a sentence of probation while
another was sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment.
"The Sentencing Reform Act sought to remedy this defect
by abolishing parole, substituting a system of determinate
sentences, and providing sentencing courts with explicit
direction, in the form of binding guidelines that prescribed
the kinds and lengths of sentences appropriate for typical
federal offenders." 3 The Act achieved this by i) rejecting
rehabilitation and parole, 2) consolidating power that had
been exercised by the sentencing judge and the parole
commission instead into the United States Sentencing
Commission, 3) making all sentences determinate, 4)
making the Sentencing Commission's guidelines binding
on the courts, and 5) authorizing limited appellate review
of sentencing decisions.6 4 Congress provided for mandatory sentences, established the United States Sentencing
Commission, mandated presentence reports to assist in
calculating that range, changed the law regarding fines,
special assessment, and probation, provided for appellate
review of sentences, and, finally, abolished the Parole
Board.6 5 Blakely does not, and need not, affect all of these
provisions.
The state of Kansas chose to modify its sentencing
scheme to comply with Apprendi through legislation,66
sending sentence-enhancing facts to the jury for proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. 67 Federal judges probably
could accomplish the same thing on their own. 68 As in
Kansas, a federal jury could hear evidence of guilt and
evidence supporting aggravating facts, either in a unitary
proceeding, or, in the judge's discretion, in a bifurcated
proceeding. 69 There seems to be no constitutional or
federal statutory barrier to this solution.
Should the trial be bifurcated, the second hearing
would not be a sentencing hearing, but a trial of one or
more elements of a criminal offense, and the usual trial
procedures would probably apply, including those rules
governing jury selection, instruction, argument, as well as
evidentiary standards required by statute and the Constitution for proving elements of crimes. Illegally obtained
evidence may have to be excluded; as would hearsay if its
admission would violate the defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause. In other words, the government
could not, after Blakely, rely on hearsay statements in the
presentence report to establish the facts that federal law
makes essential to a higher penalty. The jury determination would probably require unanimity, and be limited
by the same procedures regulating deadlock instructions,
verdicts, polling, and jury misconduct. These entitlements
turn, it seems to us, on whether facts identified in Blakely
and Apprendi are functioning as elements, or whether, as
some have argued in the past, they are hybrids, not quite
elements, and not sentencing factors, but something
in between - superfacts that require some procedural
protections but not all. There is little in Justice Scalia's
opinion for the Court in Blakely that would suggest that
the Court is considering a novel status for these facts.
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Everything points to treating them just like any other
7°
element.
Predictions that guideline facts would be impossible
to prove to juries7' or review on appeal 7' are, we believe,
exaggerated. Admittedly, upward adjustments for relevant
73
conduct would be difficult to administer after Blakely.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide that criminal
conduct related to the conduct of conviction be brought to
the attention of the judge by the Probation Department,
and that the judge shall adjust a sentence for relevant
conduct, whether the prosecutor makes this request or
not. 74 As the Dep~rtment of Justice points out in its
recent brief: "Aside from the difficulty of instructing
a jury on the quite complex issues arising in applying
these definitions.... requiring jury determinations on
relevant conduct could take a criminal trial into areas
far afield from the core question that is suitable for
jury resolution - whether the defendant committed
the particular crime with which he was charged."75 It
would appear that preserving what can be salvaged of the
Guidelines after Blakely would require that defendants
absorb the risks raised by adding findings of other criminal
conduct to a trial, unless a judge chooses to bifurcate the
trial. Further, it would require interpreting Blakely to
overrule Witte v. United States, 76 and United States v.
Watts,77 to the extent that those cases permit the judge
to make findings regarding uncharged and acquitted
conduct that enhance a defendant's sentence beyond the
maximum sentence specified in the Guidelines for the
offense of conviction.
One important set of adjustments is entirely lost.
Increases based on conduct that occurs during or after
the trial is no longer available after Blakely. Perjury,
obstruction of justice, or intimidation of witnesses now
must be dealt with via contempt proceedings 76 or through
additional criminal charges.
Nevertheless, juries can be instructed on the meaning
of most Guidelines factors7 9 and their factual findings
reviewed using the same standards applied to guilty
verdicts today. Judicial application of the Guidelines,
given the jury's findings, may be reviewed just as they
were before Blakely. Juries need not be asked to apply
the grouping provisions as they appear now, but need
only find the underlying facts, such as whether the count
involved substantially the same harm."° Blakely does
not mandate jury sentencing, only jury fact-finding for
facts triggering sentences beyond those authorized by
the conviction alone; the jury will still not know the
punishment consequences of its findings. While the jury
will be tasked with many more factual findings, all of the
policy choices made by the Commission about how much
time follows from what sorts of facts would remain in
place.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the Guidelines
remain unchanged in cases where, for example, the judge
sentences a defendant within the presumptive sentencing
range provided for the offense of conviction, or raises
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the sentence based on prior convictions alone. A facial
challenge to the Guidelines, therefore, is a non-starter.8 '
Consider the unsuccessful attempt by a panel of the
Ninth Circuit to invalidate on its face 21 U.S.C. § 841
after the Court's decision in Apprendi. In enacting § 841,
Congress had dearly intended that drug quantities would
be determined by a judge.8" Apprendi struck down this
legislative scheme in cases where findings of drug quantity
raised the defendant's sentence above the maximum term
authorized without that finding.8 3 En banc, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a panel opinion that had
concluded that 21 U.S.C. § 841 was facially invalid due to
Apprendi's rule4
Following Blakely, just as some courts have begun
to sentence without the Guidelines after concluding the
entire scheme is unconstitutional, a number of courts
have chosen to assume they are still binding and apply
a modified version of the Guidelines. 85 For example, in
United States v. Fanfan,"6 the judge held that since the
indictment alleged only a conspiracy involving 5o0 grams
of powder cocaine, producing a presumptive guideline
range of 63-78 months, Blakelyrequired that he reject the
Probation Department's Presentence report calculating a
guideline sentence of188-2 3 5 months based upon relevant
conduct involving crack cocaine and the defendant's
leadership role in the conspiracy, and that he impose a
sentence of no more than 78 months.7 In United States v.
Montgomery, the judge rejected the option of discarding
the guidelines and instead chose to sentence the defendant
to the range mandated by the guidelines for only the facts
admitted by the defendant.88
In sum, patching the hole in the Guidelines scheme
left by Blakely may prove challenging and somewhat incomplete, and surely unsatisfying for the long run, but it
is not impossible. As Justice Scalia stated in Blakely, the
decision "is not about whether determinate sentencing
is constitutional, only about how it can be implemented
in a way that respects the Sixth Amendment."89 Severing from the Guidelines only judicial fact-finding for
maximum-enhancing facts will render the Act less effective in securing the uniformity in sentencing that
Congress originally intended. Even without this feature,
however, the Act continues to advance its overall goals. 9°
Whether Congress would have chosen to enact a Guidelines system that complies with Blakely, rather than retain
criminal sentencing in its pre-198 4 state, is anybody's
guess. If we had to decide the issue of severability today,
we would come down in favor of retaining what is left of
the Guidelines.
II. Post-Blakely Strategy
In this section, we review some of the anecdotal information we have been picking up about Blakely in practice.
The best public source of information on Blakely so far
is the web site maintained by Professor Doug Berman,
http://sentencing.typepad.com. Based upon what we hear
from sources at various U.S. Attorney's offices, Federal
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Public Defender services, and federal judicial chambers
across the country (not by any means a scientific sample),
we can be sure of only one thing: no one is certain how to
proceed in the wake of Blakely.
Most judges we have reached tell us that until Congress,
the U.S. Sentencing Commission, or the Court says
otherwise, they will assume that Blakely does apply to the
Guidelines, and that the new "statutory maximum" is the
top of the range designated for the offense of conviction
absent additional findings. As the early decisions under
Blakely recounted above demonstrate, however, there is
no consensus on severability.
The Department of Justice memorandum states the
official position for prosecutors. Prosecutors have been
instructed to seek to obtain plea agreements that waive
all rights under Blakely, and include provisions that "the
defendant agrees to have his sentence determined under
the Sentencing Guidelines; waives any right to have facts
that determine his offense level under the Guidelines ...
alleged in an indictment and found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt; agrees that facts that determine the
offense level will be found by the court at sentencing by a
preponderance of the evidence and that the court may consider any reliable evidence, including hearsay; and agrees
to waive all constitutional challenges." 9' Some prosecutors may not vigorously defend the position advanced in
the DOJ memo that Blakely does not apply, or that these
waivers are valid. As one prosecutor put it, "where there
is tension between what my local district judge wants and
what General Ashcroft wants, the local judge wins every
time."
We are also hearing from some prosecutors that
they will try to pack as many aggravating sentencing
factors into plea agreements as possible. The chief of one
prosecutor's office tells us that he is adding aggravating
factors into indictments where indictments have not yet
been returned, and filing notices ofaggravating sentencing
factors after indictments and before plea or trial. His
position is that if a defendant agrees to waive a jury trial
on guilt or innocence she should also agree to waive the
same regarding aggravating sentencing factors included.
For those cases that will proceed to jury trial, he will request
that the aggravating sentencing factors be submitted to
the jury as special issues of factfindings to be made after
the defendant has been found guilty of the underlying
offense.
Federal prosecutors may also attempt to pick the
charges with the highest base offense levels. This will
not be generally helpful, however, as the Guidelines are
structured such that similar charges result in the same
base offense level on the sentencing grid.9" Prosecutors
may try to select charges that include sentencing enhancements based upon prior convictions, 93 exempted from
Apprendi's rule, 94 or that carry mandatory minimum
sentences, also exempt. 95 Because mandatory minimum
sentences trump a lower guidelines sentence, 96 the "maximum sentence" for the offense of conviction will always
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be at least the mandatory minimum sentence. 97 There
may be instances where prosecutors would have dropped
an i8 U.S.C. § 9 2 4 (c)(i)(A) charge in exchange for a plea to
the underlying drug offense, accepting a two level increase
for the possession of a firearm in lieu of the five-year consecutive mandatory minimum sentence under § 924(c).
Post-Blakely, a prosecutor will need to obtain a defense
stipulation to the weapon before the plea agreement can
include a sentence based on this fact, making this sort of
deal less attractive.
In many cases, prosecutors predict that in plea bargaining over these types of factors they may have to give
up certain enhancements or charges in order to obtain
defendants' admissions to other factors and charges. The
Department of Justice is advising its attorneys to seek
waivers of both jury and burden of proof, 9s but defendants
will not be keen to waive, without some significant benefit
in return, the higher burden of proof in cases where the
government's evidence supporting the aggravating fact is
inadmissible hearsay, or leaves room for doubt. In these
cases, this will change the dynamic of plea bargaining in
favor of the defendant, as the prosecutor must now also
bargain for admissions to sentence enhancing facts, facts
which, without the defendant's admissions, the prosecutor would have to establish a beyond a reasonable doubt
using only admissible evidence. 99 On the other hand, in
some cases certain aggravating facts are so prejudicial to a
defendant that the prosecutor loses nothing by refusing to
bargain over them, knowing that unless the judge intends
to bifurcate the proceeding, the defendant will not want
the issue raised to a jury. A defendant may offer to plead
guilty to everything but the aggravator, then have that
fact tried to the bench, but the prosecutor would have the
authority to veto this compromise and force the defendant
to choose between admitting everything or a jury trial.
Much will depend on the type of aggravating fact and the
strength of the government's proof on that fact.
Our contacts in federal public defenders offices and
the private criminal defense bar tell the same story.
Despite the Thornburgh, Reno, and Ashcroft memoranda
ostensibly limiting prosecutorial power to bargain (which
some believe are still honored most often in the breach),'
defenders expect to be in a position to attain better deals
in many cases. The higher burden of proof and more
restrictive evidence rules may defeat some allegations that
had been successful in the past. In at least one office, some
federal public defenders have been able to obtain lower
guideline sentences by pleading open to existing charges,
before prosecutors could secure superceding indictments
with added enhancing facts. This is only a short term
strategy, already ending as prosecutors add aggravating
facts to indictments.-°
The word from some chambers is that judges will let
their magistrates take the pleas, and will not formally
accept them until sentencing - and then only if the
defendant either stipulates to every aggravator in the
presentence report, the prosecutor declines to pursue that
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aggravator, or a jury is empaneled to decide the matter.
A number have also indicated that they will formally warn
each defendant about the ramifications of Blakely during
the Rule ii colloquy. While some judges appear willing to
offer two sentences, one under the Guidelines pre-Blakely
and one with the unaggravated sentencing range, °- others
may refuse to do this. With Blakely less than a month old,
its effect on charging, bargaining, and sentencing norms
is far from clear.
Ill. Raising Blakely on Direct Appeal and
Collateral Review
The review of cases in which defendants have already
been sentenced pose additional issues. A small number
of defendants sentenced just as the Blakely decision was
announced may be able to seek resentencing under Rule
35(a) (formerly Rule 35(c) before the 2002 "restyling"
of the Fed. R. Crim. P., but that relief is available only
within seven days after sentencing.1° 3 There is also some
authority limiting such motions to technical or clerical
corrections of the sentence, not the sort of resentencing
'
that would be required under B1akely.o4
The vast majority
of federal prisoners will be raising Blakelyon appeal or in
applications for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
A. Challenging Federal Sentences on Appeal
Defendants can expect to encounter several barriers to
appellate relief when challenging their sentences under
Blakely. First, as noted in Part II, for defendants convicted
following guilty plea, none of the facts admitted by the
defendant at the plea hearing, in the plea or sentencing
agreement, or at sentencing may form the basis for a
Blakely appeal. I 5 Nor can a defendant who was convicted
at trial maintain a Blakely claim if the contested facts
triggering the higher sentence range were specifically
found as part of the jury's verdict of guilt. If the defendant
waived a jury and was convicted after a bench trial, facts
found by the judge beyond a reasonable doubt under Rule
23(c) are not subject to challenge either. Even without
these findings or admissions, relief may be unavailable
due to the defendant's waiver of the right to raise his
Blakely claim, or due to the application of harmless error
and plain error review standards under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52.
1. Express Waiver
Many defendants sentenced prior to Blakely will have
entered into a plea agreement containing an express
waiver of the right to challenge their sentences on appeal.
Knowing and voluntary waivers of the right to appeal
were held to bar otherwise valid claims for relief under
Apprendi in some circuits, and should have the same
effect here."' 6 Some courts have concluded that they will
not enforce agreements to insulate from review what
are essentially illegal sentences, beyond the authority of
courts to impose."' 7 In circuits that uphold Apprendi or
Blakely waivers, whether a waiver bars relief will depend
on its wording. Consider a defendant who reserved in
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his plea or sentencing agreement the right to appeal a
sentence imposed above the "statutory maximum," with
no reference to a specific statute or statutory maximum
sentence. He may have a shot at arguing that the agreement allows appeal of any sentence that exceeds the top of
the guidelines range authorized by the facts admitted or
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that is, the "statutory
maximum" as defined for purposes of the Sixth Amendment by the Supreme Court in Blakely.'° Similarly, a
defendant who reserved the right to appeal any sentence
imposed in violation of Apprendi should be able to raise
a Blakely claim on appeal. A waiver of the right to appeal
the conviction, without any mention of sentence, will not
bar a Blakely claim on appeal.
Many waiver provisions, however, condition the right of
appeal upon the imposition of a sentence over a specified
ceiling or restrict appeal to specified claims of error.' °9 A
waiver might reserve the right to appeal only if the judge
departs upward under U.S.S.G. Part 5, for example. Such
a waiver may bar any challenge under Blakelyor Apprendi
to sentences other than those in which the judge actually
relied upon an upward departure."" One claim commonly
exempted from appeal waiver provisions is the ineffective
assistance of counsel."' A defendant who is barred by his
waiver from raising Blakely error directly on appeal may
succeed in rasing it indirectly, as a claim that his attorney
should have pursued or reserved an Apprendi challenge
to his sentence.
2. Plain Error
Even for those defendants who do not expressly waive
their claims, relief may be difficult to obtain. A defendant
who did not raise his claim while in trial court will be
entitled to relief only if he can meet the plain error
standard of Rule 52. The Court stated this review standard
succinctly in United States v. Cotton..'
[B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not
raised at trial, there must be (i)error, (2) that is
plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three
conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise
its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4)
the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Turning to the second requirement, that the error be
plain, the Court has explained that it is enough that the
error be clear under the law as it stands at appeal. That
the law at the time of trial appeared contrary to Blakely
does not preclude relief;" 3 it does not matter that the trial
judge and the attorneys in the case didn't see Blakely
coming.
The third and fourth requirements will be key in may
of these cases. The defendant will have the burden of
demonstrating that if had he raised the error, there is a
reasonable probability that he would have received a lower
sentence. ' 4 In cases where there is overwhelming and
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uncontroverted evidence to establish the facts contested
under Blakely, relief will be unavailable."5 In cases where
the aggravating fact was based on disputed hearsay, a
defendant may be able to meet this burden.
3. Harmless Error
A defendant should be entitled to relief from his illegal
sentence if he has preserved his Blakely challenge for
appeal, and demonstrates that his sentence exceeded the
punishment authorized solely by the facts admitted or
proven as part of his conviction. A defendant preserves
his Blakely challenge, we believe, if he objects under
Apprendi to the omission of facts triggering upward
adjustments from the indictment, or demands the right to
a jury determination or proof beyond a reasonable doubt
for those facts. With upward adjustments common in
setting offense levels under the Guidelines, a defendant
may very well find some fact not admitted or proven to a
jury that had an effect on the authorized sentence range.
However, in some cases the government might be able to
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
would have received the same sentence had Blakely been
followed., 6 For example, an upward adjustment may have
had no effect on a defendant's sentencing range if the
range was mandated independently by the defendant's
prior criminal history, still a valid enhancement under
Almendarez-Torres."7
Alternatively, if the trial judge happened to place on the
record the sentence she would have imposed assuming
the Guidelines were held to be unconstitutional in whole
or in part, and if the Court holds that due to Blakely, judges
are not bound by even those guidelines specifying ranges
for minimum offense levels, a reviewing court may be able
to point to the court's alternative, non-Guideline sentence
as proof that the Blakely error did not affect the outcome.
The Court has not addressed directly the application of
harmless error review to the failure to charge an Apprendi
fact in an indictment, but lower courts have found that
indictment defects will be reviewed for harmless error just
as the failure to prove the fact to a jury with proof beyond
8
a reasonable doubt."
4. What is the Appropriate Remedy?
Assuming that a reviewing court finds that a Blakely
error was not harmless, a reviewing court may choose to
simply reduce the defendant's sentence to the maximum
allowed based on the elements that were admitted or
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A more difficult issue
is raised if the case is remanded for resentencing.
One option always open to the parties faced with a
Blakely violation is settlement, even after appeal. Alternatively, if a trial judge anticipates that Blakely has vitiated
the entire mandatory Guidelines scheme, leaving only
the statutory ranges specified in the statute defining the
offense, or a set of voluntary guidelines with no binding
effect, the judge may choose to resentence the defendant
as if the Guidelines were no longer binding. A judge
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should avoid resentencing the defendant to a more severe
sentence to steer clear of any claim of vindictiveness,"9
but would otherwise be free to select a sentence under
the traditional relaxed sentencing processes upheld in
Williams v. New York.' 2° This option is a good one for
the defendant if the judge, freed of the Guidelines' constraints, would have imposed a lower sentence. On the
other hand, a judge may choose to impose the exact same
sentence that she would have imposed under the Guidelines, so that the defendant gains exactly nothing by a
successful Blakely appeal.
If a judge concludes that Blakely does not permit
this option, but instead invalidates only the provisions
authorizing judicial findings by a preponderance for facts
triggering upward adjustments and departures, leaving
the rest of the Guidelines intact, the next issue is whether
the Double Jeopardy Clause will allow the government
an opportunity to establish the Blakely/Apprendi-facts
on remand. Although remand for "resentencing" is not
barred by double jeopardy,'"' Blakely/Apprendi facts are
elements, and a hearing to establish them is equivalent to
a trial on the elements of the offense.
First, double jeopardy may bar additional proof on the
aggravating facts on remand if the offender's conviction
is considered an implied acquittal of the greater offense
2
that the government wants a second chance to prove.'1
However, no double jeopardy problem is posed by trial of
the aggravating factor or factors on remand if Blakelyerror
is no different in kind from other errors in procedure that
affect the determination of the elements of crime, such
as the empaneling of a biased jury or a faulty burden of
proof instruction.' 23 When the defendant's allegation of
error under Blakely is that he deserved certain procedural
protections and didn't get them, not that evidence on
the aggravating element was insufficient, his claim is
equivalent to a demand for a new trial. Remand and
retrial will provide the defendant everything he is entitled
to under the Constitution. For example, in Arizona, the
state's high court rejected a double jeopardy challenge
to resentencing by defendants whose death sentences
were invalidated by Ring, after reasoning that a judge, the
fact-finder, "made those findings necessary to impose a
death sentence. In no sense has a fact-finder concluded
that the state failed to prove aggravating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt. On remand, no defendant
can receive a sentence greater than that which already has
been imposed. Accordingly, we hold that jeopardy has not
attached."" 4 The Supreme Court of Idaho agrees with this
rationale, and has also approved of trials upon remand of
5
the aggravating facts in Ring-affected cases.'"
Admittedly, there is no express statutory authority for
a judge to empanel a jury to make such findings. What's
left of the federal sentencing statute does not provide for
juries to find these facts.' 26 Nevertheless, there does not
appear to be any statutory or constitutional prohibition
against partial guilty pleas or bifurcated trials, so long as
the parties have agreed. Thus, one option open to judges
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facing resentencing after a conviction by either jury trial
or plea, would be to empanel a jury for the purpose of
determining the Blakely facts alone." 7 The judge would
limit proof to evidence relevant to the facts at issue, and
instruct the jury to determine only whether those facts have
been established by the government beyond a reasonable
doubt.2 In essence this proceeding would be one part of
a bifurcated proceeding - with some of the elements of
the offense being resolved in one proceeding (by plea or
jury trial) and other elements resolved in this later jury
trial. And assuming a defendant had pleaded guilty to the
basic offense prior to appeal of his sentence, both parties
would have agreed to settlement as a resolution, of at least
those elements, and the charge need not be reopened to be
tried or negotiated anew. Only the unresolved aggravating
features would remain to be determined, and a defendant
could only waive his right to a jury determination of those
facts with the consent of the government and the court. 9
A more potent double jeopardy problem is raised, we
believe, in cases in which the Apprendi/Blakely facts,
essentially elements of a greater offense, were never
alleged in the indictment. A defendant should not be
subjected to retrial on remand if he shows not only that
the aggravating fact was decided by the wrong fact-finder
under the wrong standard of proof, but also that the fact
was never alleged in the indictment. When the defect
in the indictment is not harmless, (e.g., the record lacks
proof of the fact beyond a reasonable doubt), then the
judge should be limited to sentencing within the legal
maximum for the offense alleged in the indictment. 3 ° A
trial of the aggravating factors after remand would require
a new indictment on the greater offense, which would
3
constitute a second prosecution for the same offense.'1
B. Collateral Review Under § 2255
Under Teague v. Lane, federal courts may not grant relief
under § 2255 on the basis of a "new" rule of criminal
procedure announced after the prisoner's conviction
became final. 3" Prisoners whose convictions became final
before Blakely was handed down on June 24, 2004, are
probably not going to be able to rely on the decision for
relief, but we believe this is a close question. If we are
wrong about this, and Blakely was not a new rule, but
was instead an inescapable application of Apprendi, then,
just as Justice O'Connor predicted in her Blakely dissent,
prisoners whose convictions became final anytime after
Apprendi was announced could seek relief under § 2255.

1. Blakely is Probably a New Rule, Applicable Only to
those Cases with Appeals Pending as of June 24, 2004
The key here will be determining whether Blakely
is "new" or was instead "mandated," "compelled" and
"'dictated by then-existing precedent," so that "the unlawfulness ... was apparent to all reasonable jurists"' 33 once
Apprendi was announced. Our own impression is that
judges and lawyers around the nation were stunned by the
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Blakelydecision. But lack of prescience by criminal justice
insiders is not the test. The test is one of logic and legal
reasoning, and the result is not overwhelmingly obvious.
Prisoners seeking retroactive application of Blakely
back to the date Apprendi was decided must confront the
Court's decision in Schriro v. Summerlin, 4 in which the
Court held that the rule in Ring requiring jury determination of aggravating facts could not be applied retroactively
to Summerlin's case, because the rule was "new" when
Summerlin's direct appeal ended, and did not fit within
an exception to the bar against retroactive application of
new rules on collateral review. Defendants may argue
that Blakely, unlike Ring, is not "new," because it did not
require the Court to overrule an earlier precedent." In
Apprendi itself, some justices warned of the decision's
impact on presumptive sentencing systems such as the
one in Washington and the federal guidelines, 36 and several scholars evaluating the Apprendi decision concluded
the same. Furthermore, many of the prisoners that challenged their federal sentences after Apprendi made the
37
very argument that later garnered five votes in Blakely.'
Most important, defendants will point out, even though
the Court declared the rule in Ring "new" for purposes of
Summerlin's case, because Summerlin's conviction was
final well before the Court decided Apprendi, the Court
never addressed whether the rule in Ring may have been
compelled, dictated, or mandated by Apprendi itself."

3

If

the Blakely rule was dictated by Apprendi, then prisoners
whose direct appeals were pending when Apprendi was
announced will not be barred by Teague from raising their
Blakely claims.
Alternatively, a prisoner may argue that even if Apprendidid not announce what all reasonable jurists should
have recognized then as the Blakely rule, Ring did. Ring
stated that a defendant is entitled to the right to a jury trial
on those factors which raise "the ceiling of the sentencing
range available"' 39 and rejected the state's argument that
the statutory maximum sentence for first degree murder
was death, instead looking at the effect of the state law
in limiting a convicted murderer's sentence to life unless
additional facts were found. 14' The state's first-degree
murder statute "authorizes a maximum penalty of death
only in a formal sense," wrote the Court, "for it explicitly cross-references the statutory provision requiring the
finding of an aggravating circumstance before imposition of the death penalty." This move in Ring, darifying
that the maximum penalty authorized by the verdict for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment is not the "formal"
ceiling identified by the statute defining the offense, but
is instead the maximum penalty authorized by additional
sentencing provisions, arguable "dictated" and "compelled" the Blakely decision. If so, then the window for
relief under § 2255 for Blakely claimants shrinks to those
with convictions that became final after June 2002.
Against retroactive application, however, are the following, and we think, more persuasive, arguments. Blakely
was a dose case, with a bare majority of justices finding
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that the Constitution required its holding. When four justices of the Supreme Court reject a rule as not compelled
by the Constitution, it is difficult to maintain that the rule
was dictated by precedent and apparent to "all reasonable
jurists." As Justice O'Connor points out in her dissent,
Apprendi would have been consistent with a different
outcome in Blakely. The "statutory maximum" sentence
that the Apprendi Court held must not be exceeded could
have been interpreted in the Blakely case to be the ceiling
for all class B felonies in the Washington code, not the
presumptive ceiling under the codified guidelines. Not
only did four justices disagree with the Blakely Court's
application of Apprendi, every state supreme court and
federal court of appeals, other than Kansas, had rejected
the argument that Apprendi invalidated presumptive
sentencing schemes.'' 4 Judge Tjofiat, for example, stated
that the constitutionality under Apprendi of guidelines
sentences within the maximum sentence designated in
the U.S. Code was "obvious." 4 In sum, Blakely may be
consistent with Apprendi and Ring,'43 but it is difficult
to maintain that "no other interpretation" of Apprendi or
Ring was "reasonable."I44

2. Blakely Would not Meet the Exception for
Retroactive Application of Watershed Rules
If indeed Blakely was not compelled by Apprendi,then
retroactive application is possible only if the rule it declares
fits within one of the narrow exceptions in Teague. There
is little hope for retroactive application of Blakely under
the exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure
essential to the fairness of the proceeding now that the
Court in Summerlin held that the same rule in Ring fails
5
to meet this exception."
A memorandum for panel attorneys prepared in
the wake of Blakely argues that because the Court in
Summerlin addressed only the retroactivity of the right
to jury holding of Ring and did not address whether
the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement was
retroactive,'46 there is still a chance that the proof-beyonda-reasonable-doubt requirement of Blakely, and Apprendi
itself, would be applied retroactively. The memo points
to Hankerson v. North Carolina, in which Mullaney v.
Wilbur was held to apply retroactively, and to Ivan V v.
47
City of New York, applying In re Winship retroactively.'
There are three reasons to anticipate rejection of this
rationale as a basis for applying Blakely and Apprendi
retroactively on collateral review.
First, both older cases applying the burden of proof
rulings retroactively preceded Teague. Unlike Gideon v.
Wainwright,which the Court in its cases applying Teague
holds out as a paradigm for retroactive application on
collateral review, both of the older burden of proof cases
involved retroactive application on direct appeal not on
collateral review. Second, the Apprendi/Blakely rule is
arguably not as sweeping and fundamental as the rule
established in Winship or Mullaney, much less Gideon.
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Mullaney reallocated the burden of proof, from defense
to prosecution, for certain factual findings; Blakely and
Apprendi simply raised, by degree, a burden of proof that
had already rested with the government. Moreover, while
Winship, like Blakely and Apprendi, raised a burden
already carried by the government, it did so in cases
in which none of the elements had been established
previously beyond a reasonable doubt. The change brought
about by Blakelyand Apprendiwas much less fundamental
- adding certain facts to the list of elements already
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlike cases falling
afoul of Winship, in any Blakely or Apprendi case the
defendant will have been provided with the right to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt on every element of some
offense, albeit a lesser offense than the one for which he
was sentenced. Winship, then, was essential to prevent
the punishment of defendants innocent of any crime.
Finally, compared to the rule providing the right to
counsel in Gideon, which the Court in Summerlin noted
was so sweeping that it affected "every felony case," and
which affected the very structure of the trial and appellate
process itself, the rule in Blakely/Apprendi is far less
sweeping. Unlike Gideon, it affects only the process for
proving certain additional elements, not the entire case.
This feature persuaded the Court in Cotton to conclude
that Apprendi is not a rule that requires relief under plain
error review should the defendant fail to raise it in the trial
14 8

court

3. Successive Motions and Late Filings Under § 2255
Applicants who raise their Blakely claims in a second
or successive § 2255 motion will encounter a dead end.
Relief for such claims is available only if the court of
appeals will certify that the claim is based on "a new
rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court that was previously
unavailable." '49 But, as the Court made clear in Tyler v.
Cain,'5' no Court of Appeals can make such a certification
unless and until the United States Supreme Court decides
that Blakely should be applied retroactively, a decision we
believe is unlikely to materialize.' 5'
A retroactivity problem also arises if a defendant's first
attempt to seek relief from Blakely error under § 2255 is
filed more than a year following the date on which the
original judgment became final. An exception to the oneyear limitations period provides that the period will not
begin to run until the "date on which the right asserted
was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that
right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review...."
IV. Congressional Response to Blakely
In this section we collect some of the options Congress
might pursue in response to Blakely, assuming that courts
hold that the case applies to the Guidelines. Three options
are noted by Justice Breyer in his Blakely dissent. First,
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Congress could return to the i8th century pure "charge
offense" or "determinate" sentencing.' 0 We agree with
Justice Breyer that such a system "assures uniformity, but
at intolerable costs."

53

It imposes identical punishments

on defendants who commit their crimes quite differently,
and thus fails to provide individual justice.
Second, Justice Breyer recognizes that Congress could
return to the pre-1984 system of discretionary sentencing
based on pure judicial discretion within the statutory maximum penalty. Or, as Professors Kate Stith and William
Stuntz suggest,' 54 Congress could make the Guidelines
voluntary. Either scenario seems to us highly unlikely in
today's political climate. The goals of punishment proportional to the gravity of the offense and parity among
defendants that prompted the determinate sentencing
movement have not diminished since 1984.'55 The animating purpose underlying the Sentencing Reform Act
was precisely to eliminate such wide judicial discretion,
and in its recent actions Congress has shown only an interest in constricting, not expanding, the little discretion
that federal judges still possess. 56
Finally, Justice Breyer notes a third option (the one
"which the Court seems to believe legislators will in fact
take"'15) is for the legislative bodies to do nothing and allow
aggravators under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to
be submitted to juries, limiting judicial discretion to
downward departures. In the short run, this is just what
many courts are doing. Some defenders are urging that
Congress and the Commission codify this approach.' 58
We see at-least two more options. Congress might
take Judge Cassell's suggestion in Croxford of "replacing
the carefully-calibrated Guidelines with a series of flat
mandatory minimum sentences."' 59 Much more realistically, Congress could model the federal guidelines on the
Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, which limit judicial
discretion only concerning the minimum sentence but
say nothing about the maximum, which can be as high
as the statutory maximum for the offense. 6° Professor
Bowman has suggested a similar quick fix, recommending that the Commission "amend the sentencing range
on the Chapter 5 Sentencing Table to increase the top
of each guideline range to the statutory maximum of
6
the offense(s) of conviction."' ' By chopping the tops off

the ranges and by encouraging judges to follow prior
ceilings as unenforceable maxima in policy statements,
many of the existing gradations between defendants and
offenses might be preserved, assuming that judges take
the Commission's recommendations to heart.
There are reasons to be wary of such a proposal, and
the debate is unfolding in Washington as this is written.
Judicial discretion will not be cabined at the top - only at
the bottom. We do believe that such a transformation of
sentencing factors into "de facto" mandatory minimum
penalties will probably survive constitutional challenge in
the Supreme Court, so long as Harrisv. United States, upholding the constitutional validity of judicial fact-finding
6
for mandatory minimum sentences, remains good law. ,
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Whether Harrissurvives will depend on the views of the
justices about the function of the Sixth Amendment jury
trial right, and how closely that guarantee limits legislative
authority to define the substantive criminal law.

(2004) ("unlike the Washington system, the federal
Guidelines are not enacted by a legislature but are
promulgated by the Sentencing Commission, 'an
independent commission in the judicial branch of the United
States,"' citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2004)).
16 DOJ sample brief, supra note 14, at 13. Dissenting in U.S. v.
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Booker, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14223 (7th Cir. July 9, 2004),
Judge Easterbrook also argues that Blakely is limited to
"statutes" (analogizing the Commission's Sentencing
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Guidelines to the federal Parole Commission's release
guidelines, which are not submitted to a jury).
Justice Scalia, the author of Blakely, for example, is on
record that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are
unconstitutional. Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 413, 426
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (terming the Commission a
"junior-varsity Congress").
Id. at 393-94. See also Stinson v. U.S., 508 U.S. 36 (1993)
(the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have the force of law).
See e.g. Congressional rejection of two attempts by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission to modify the 100-1 powder to
crack cocaine sentencing ratio, text of proposed
amendments reprinted at 57 CRIM. L. REP. 2095, 2096
(1995) and 10 FED.SENT. REP. 184 (1998); PROTECT Act,
Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 41(b), (g), (i), 117 Stat. 650, 668-69,
671-73 (2003) (amending guidelines regarding child
pornography, curbing judicial discretion to depart
downward, and changing appellate standard of review of
criminal sentences).
Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537.
See Booker, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14223 (7th Cir. 7/9/04)
(opinion by Posner, J.). The decision includes an interesting
debate over whether the Court would have to overrule its
decision in Edwards v. U.S., 523 U.S. 511 (1998), in order to
reach this conclusion. We agree with Judge Posner on this
point. See also U.S. v. Lamoreaux, 2004 WL 1557283 (W.D.
Mo. July 7, 2004) (agreeing with Judge Cassell in Croxf6rd
that Blakely does apply to the federal sentencing guidelines,
and that the Guidelines provisions providing for judicial
factfinding cannot be severed). See also U.S. v. Ameline, No.
02-30326 (9th Cir. July 21, 2004) ("we hold that Blakely's
definition of statutory maximum applies to the
determination of the base offense presumptive ranges under
§ 2D1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines... ").See also United
States v. Epis, 2004 WL 1562934, (9th Cir. July 12, 2004)
(remanding case to district court in light of United States
Supreme Court certiorari in Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222
(9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, No. 03-1454 (U.S. June 28,
2004), and, if conviction remains intact, for resentencing in
light of Blakely). An up-to-date list of District and Circuit
opinions post-Blakely can be found on http://sentencing.
typepad.com - click on USSGuide Blakely.
The Department of Justice has already asked the Court to
hear Booker and FanFan (see infra, note 86) on an expedited
basis, early in the new term. U.S. v. Booker, No. 04-104
(2004); U.S. v. FanFan, No. 04-105 (2004); Lyle Denniston,
Justice Dept. Seeks Decision on Sentencing, NEW YORK TIMES
July 20, 2004, A12. The Court granted certiorari on Booker
and Fanfan on August 2, 2004. See http://sentencing.
typepad.com
See U.S. v. Pineiro, 2004 WL 1543170 (5th Cir. July 12,
2004) (where jury found defendant guilty of conspiring to
distribute less than 50 kilograms of marijuana and 50
grams or less of cocaine, court upheld judicial sentence
based upon much higher quantities of drugs indicated in the
Presentence Investigation Report and enhancement based
upon defendant's leadership role).
Id. at "6-10 (noting that the Court has upheld the
Guidelines in Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989), Edwards

5
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v. U.S., 523 U.S. 511 (1998), Wittev. U.S., 515 U.S. 389
(1995), and U.S. v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997)).
24 Order of July 19, 2004, granting rehearing en banc in U.S. v.
Montgomery, 2004 Fed. App. 0226P (6th Cir. 2004) (Merritt,
J.) (where enhanced six month sentence was based upon
judicial finding of $21,000 of loss involved in bank fraud,
judgment vacated and remanded for resentencing to comply
with Blakely and the Sixth Amendment). We do not agree
with the panel's reading of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 as
discretionary. Such an argument was advanced in Daniel
Freed & Marc Miller, 3 FED.SENT. REP. 237 (1991) and

25

26
27
28

3o

31
32
33

3

36

37

rejected by the en banc Sixth Circuit in U.S. v. Davern, 970
F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
923 (1993).
Penaranda, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14268; U.S. v. Rojas,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14268 (2d Cir. July 12, 2004) (en
banc) (presenting three questions to the Court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), which can be distilled to whether
Blakely applies to judicial fact-finding that results in a higher
offense level and other upward adjustment under the federal
Sentencing Guidelines).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2004); 5th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr.
Crim. § 2.60 (2002).
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2004).
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(a) (2003) (which
gives an offense level of 6, and assuming a criminal history
category of 1 (or 0 criminal history points)).
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §281.1(b)(1) (2003).
Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537 (emphasis in original).
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, §§2, 3 (2003).
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 181.3 (2003).
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K (2003). See also
Dilts v. Oregon, 2004 WL 540530 (June 28, 2004) (vacating
the case and remanding to the Supreme Court of Oregon for
further consideration in light of Blakely). In State v. Dilts the
court held that an imposition of an upward departure
sentence based on the defendant's racial animus did not
violate Apprendi as it was still within the prescribed statutory
maximum sentence for the offense of assault in the third
degree to which defendant pled guilty. 82 P.3d 593 (Or.
2003) (en banc). Though the Supreme Court of Oregon
accepted the argument that an upward departure under the
Oregon Determinate Sentencing Regime did not violate
Apprendi so long as it was within the statutory maximum
penalty for a third degree felony, the United States Supreme
Court apparently believed the decision required
reconsideration in light of Blakely.
Not only must all facts increasing the Guidelines range for
the offense of conviction be submitted to the jury or
admitted by the defendant, they must also be charged by
the grand jury in the indictment. This follows from the
unanimous Court's decision in U.S. v. Cotton, that Apprendi
"facts must also be charged in the indictment." Cotton, 535
U.S. 625, 627 (2002).
See e.g. U.S. v. Shyrock, 342 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1729 (2004) (collecting authority). For
discussion of criminal forfeiture proceedings, see Charles
Alan Wright, Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Federal Practice
and Procedure vol. 3, § 546 (Criminal 3d ed., West 2004).
See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apre~s Apprendi 3 n. 9,
http://www.fjc.gov (collecting cases) (revised from Nancy J.
King & Susan R. Klein, Apres Apprendi, 12 FED.SENT. REP.
331 (2002)).
E.g., U.S. v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that
because the statute under which the District Court
sentenced defendant to pay restitution contains no
maximum penalty, Apprendi does not apply), cert. denied,
123 S.Ct. 619 (2002); U.S. v. Vera, 278 F.3d 672, 673 (7th
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39

40

41

42

43

45

Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 911 (2002). An additional
argument that might be offered to salvage restitution
rulings, but that we believe is unlikely to succeed; is the
claim that restitution is not "punishment" at all, within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause, but instead is a civil,
remedial measure. See U.S. v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049,
1054 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding Apprendi inapplicable to
restitution orders "because restitution for harm done is a
classic civil remedy"). Compare U.S. v. Ross, 279 F.3d 600
(3d Cir. 2001) (restitution is a criminal penalty); U.S. v.
Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 1997) (restitution is
a criminal penalty).
Infra n. 93 for partial list.
There are some factual assessments required in the
U.S.S.G. §§4A1.1, 4A1.2, and 4A1.3 that may require a jury
finding beyond a reasonable doubt, even after U.S. v.
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). For example,
criminal history may be influenced by whether the defendant
committed the instant offense while on release, whether a
prior state offense was insufficiently serious to be counted,
and whether an offense was a "crime of violence." Compare,
e.g., U.S. v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding
that a defendant's prior convictions were committed on
separate occasions, required for sentencing under § 924(e),
need not be submitted to a jury), cert. denied, 535 U.S.
1070 (2002); U.S. v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001)
(juvenile adjudications that do not afford the right to a jury
trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt are not "prior
convictions" within the Almendarez-Torres exception). See
also People v. Thomas, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572 (2001)
("notably, the recidivism enhancement in Almendarez-Torres
had elements apart from the mere fact of a prior conviction
... the prior conviction had to involve an 'aggravated felony'
which occurred before the alien accused's removal from this
country"), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 938 (2002); Robinson v.
State, 793 So.2d 891 (Fla. 2001) (whether a recidivist
committed a new offense within three years of being
released was not an element under ApprendD.
The Seventh Circuit in its decision in U.S. v. Booker, 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS 14223 (7th Cir. July 9, 2004), raised, but
declined to decide this issue. See also U.S. v. Croxford, 2004
WL 1551564 (D. Utah July 12, 2004); U.S. v. King, No.
6:04-CR-35 (M.D. Fla., July 20, 2004) (holding that judicial
factfinding provision is not severable from the rest of the
Guidelines).
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality
opinion).
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 24 U.S. 1 (1976)) (the one-house
legislative veto provision of the Airline Deregulation Act
covering regulations applicable to the right of first hire
portion was severable from the remainder of the program);
see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172 (1999) (revocation of usufructuary rights from
the portion of the treaty requiring removal of the Indians, as
that part of the executive order absent the removal is
incoherent); Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533
(2001) (striking funding restriction as unconstitutional, and
refusing to address severance of remaining portions of
statute, as severance was not addressed by court of
appeals); U.S. v. Grigsby, 85 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.R.I. 2000)
(section of Federal Child Support statute creating
mandatory presumption in violation of due process could be
severed from remainder of statute).
Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685.
A 1996 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3563, addressing
conditions of probation, did include a severability provision.
Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686.
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Comey memo, supra note 14, at 2 (adopting as fallback
position, in the event that the Court applies Blakely to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, that "the constitutional
aspects of the Guidelines cannot be severed from the
unconstitutional ones" in any case where a defendant
desires to contest the underlying facts of an enhancement);
DOJ sample brief, supra note 14, at 19-36.
DOJ sample brief, supra note 14, at 17. It is quite clear from
the legislative history of the Act that Congress envisioned
that factual findings triggering sentencing enhancements
would be made by the judge. See Sen. Rpt. 98-225, 75, 78,
79 (Sept. 25, 1984) (reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3258, 3261, 3262). It is equally clear, however, that they
never gave a moment's thought to the propriety of the
system if the jury were to make these factual findings.
DOJ sample brief, supra note 14, at 22 (citing 28 U.S.C. §
944(a)(1)).
DOJ sample brief, supra note 14, at 27.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 181.11 (2003).
Because the Federal Sentencing Reform Act anticipates a
constant dialogue between Congress and the
Commissioners, a persuasive argument can be made that
the Court should look at legislative intent from 1984 until
the last set of amendments to the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines in June of 2004, rather than limiting itself to the
year 1984.
Memo. from Frank 0. Bowman, M. Dale Palmer Professor of
Law, Indiana University, to the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
Blakely v. Washington (June 27, 2004) (copy online at
Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing-law-and-policy/files/ frank-bowman-original_
memoto-ussc-on-blakely.doc) [hereinafter Bowman memo].

65

Disparate sentences for similarly situated defendants were
based primarily upon geography, race, gender, and judicial
philosophy.
Id. at 5 (citing legislative history and statutes).
Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989).
See e.g. Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King & Susan R.

66

Klein, Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 3, §§ 521-539
(Criminal 3d ed., West 2004).
The legislature responded to Apprendi and the State

63

"

Supreme Court's decision in State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801
(Kan. 2001), by amending the Guidelines to provide that all
such facts "shall be presented to a jury and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt."
67

56

69
70

71

72

Id. at *7.

57 Id. at *12. He further noted that "the Guidelines ...are a
holistic system, calibrated to produce a fair sentence by a
series of both downwards and upward adjustments." Id.
Id. at *16.

73
74

59 Id. at *19.

E.g. U.S. v. Rucker, No. 03-CR-00039 (W.D. Tex. July 7,
2004); U.S. v. King, No. 6:04-CR-35 (M.D. Fla., July 20,
2004).
61 Notably, several courts prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's
holding in U.S. v. Mistretta that the Guidelines were
constitutional, held that certain provisions of the Guidelines
were not only unconstitutional, but not severable. See, e.g.,
Gubiensio-Ortis v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding that statute establishing Federal Sentencing
Commission violated the separation of powers doctrine, and
that the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act curtailing
good time credits are not severable from the
unconstitutional provision of the statute). We note that the
Court was not required to address this question (question
No. 3 in the cert. petition) because it held the Guidelines
were constitutional.
62 See Brief of the U.S. Senate as Amicus Curiae, U.S. v.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1999) (citing legislative history).
60
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§ 21-4718(b)(2) (Supp.

New Jersey demanded that all facts triggering Upward
departures under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines be
submitted to the jury. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2541.
We believe judges have the inherent authority to submit

53 Id. at 6.

U.S. v. Croxford, 2004 WL 1521560 (D. Utah July 7, 2004).
After additional briefing by the Department of Justice, Judge
Cassell again rejected the position that Blakely does not
apply to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. v. Croxford,
2004 WL 1551564 (D. Utah July 12, 2004).
55 Croxford, 2004 WL 1521560 at *1. Though the judge
claimed to hold that the Guidelines were unconstitutional
only as applied to this case, his reasoning makes them
inapplicable to any case involving an upward adjustment
beyond the sentencing range assigned for those facts
admitted or proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

KAN. STAT. ANN.

2002).
The Kansas Supreme Court in Gould held that Apprendi v.

75
76
77
78

79

81

elements of an offense to a jury. After Apprendi, judges had
no trouble submitting drug types and quantities to juries,
despite no new legislation permitting this.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718(b)(4) (2003).
See also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (quoting
Apprendi, "Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors
operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense"'); id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("the
fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the
level of punishment that the defendant receives - whether
the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing
factors, or Mary Jane - must be found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt").
This Court rejected in another context a novel in-between
status for certain penalties that would have mandated some
protections reserved for crime but not others. See Hudson v.
U.S., 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (overruling U.S. v. Harper, 490 U.S.
435 (1989)).
DOJ sample brief, supra n. 14, at 24 (quoting original but
unpublished Croxford, 2004 WL 1462111 at *10 (D. Utah
June 28, 2004)). See also revised Croxford, 2004 WL
1521560 at *11, 12, 20 (D. Utah July 7, 2004); Blakely, 124
S.Ct. at 2537-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Croxford, 2004 WL 1462111 at *21; Brief for the U.S. as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respt., Blakely v. Washington,
2004 WL 177025 at *22, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3 (2003).
18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2004); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 1B1.3(a)(2) (2003) (requiring the sentencing court to
consider "all acts or omissions ... that were part of the
same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the
offense of conviction").
DOJ.sample brief, supra note 14.
515 U.S. 389 (1995).
519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam).
See Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein,
Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 3A, §§ 701-720 (Criminal
3d ed., 2004) (discussing summary and non-summary
criminal contempt). Obstruction of justice under the current
guidelines is not limited to post-charge conduct, however.
See U.S. v. Amedeo, 370 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2004).
Judicial committees will no doubt have to redraft their
criminal pattern jury instructions to account for all of these
factors.
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3D1.2 (2002).
The Court generally and strongly disapproves of facial
attacks on federal statutes. See, e.g., Sabri v. U.S., 124 S.
Ct. 1941 (2004).
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Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (providing for a sentence

83

between 5-40 years imprisonment for 500 grams or more of
cocaine) with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (providing for
imprisonment of between 10 years and life for 5 kilograms
or more of cocaine). Congress labeled these increases under
the heading "Penalties" after all elements of the drug
offense were completed, and every court prior to Apprendi
had interpreted the drug quantity provisions as sentencing
factors, not elements. See, e.g., U.S. v. Twitty, 2000 U.S.
App. Lexis 12225 (4th Cir. May 23, 2000) (collecting cases).
See Apres Apprendi, supra note 36.

85

U.S. v. Buckland, 277 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 1105 (2002), superceded, 289 F.3d 558
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
E.g., U.S. v. Gonzalez, 2004 WL 1444872 (S.D.N.Y. June 28,

2004) (refusing to grant increased sentenced based on
possession of gun); U.S. v. Green, 2004 WL 1381101 (D.
Mass. June 18, 2004) (finding, prior to Blakely, that
Apprendi applied to the Guidelines, and that "between
'Apprendi-izing' the Guidelines and ignoring them altogether,
the Court chooses the former").
No. 03-47-P-H (D. Me. June 28, 2004). A transcript of this
opinion can be found at http://sentencing.typepad.com.
87 Id. See also U.S. v. Shamblin, 2004 WL 1468561 (S.D.W. Va.,
June 30, 2004) (resentencing defendant to twelve months'
imprisonment rather than his previous determination of
240 months, as the prior sentence was based almost
exclusively on relevant conduct and sentencing
enhancements not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt).
2004 WL 1535646 (D. Utah July 8, 2004). As this article
goes to press, a panel of the Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Ameline,
No. 02-30326 (July 21, 2004), reached the issue of
severability and held that "the government has failed to
overcome the presumption of severability," and that
"preserving the essential provisions of the Guidelines that
are not constitutionally infirm will effectuate Congressional
intent by preventing a return to the days of indeterminate
sentencing."
89
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540.
Congress considered and rejected several competing
statutes for sentencing reform when it adopted the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. For example, Congress
declined to adopt a determinate sentencing system where
sentences were fixed by Congress, as it providing too little
flexibility, and rejected a proposal that would have made the
Sentencing Guidelines advisory, because voluntary
guidelines had proved to be generally ineffective in the
states that had used them. See Br. for the U.S., U.S. v.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
9, Comey memo, supra note 14, at 4.
92 For example, where a Hobbs Act violation involves extortion
under color of official right rather than robbery by force, it
receives the same base offense level as federal bribery
under § 2C1.1, whether theft is by mail fraud or stealth it
receives the same base offense level under § 2B1.1, and
where money laundering is alleged, the base offense level is
that assigned to the offense from which laundered funds
were derived.
93 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) (food stamp fraud); 8 U.S.C.
1326(b) (illegal reentry following deportation); 18 U.S.C. §§
922(g)(1), 924(e)(1), 924(c)(1) (weapons offenses); 18
U.S.C. §§ 1030(c), 1029(c) (unauthorized use of
computers/access devices, credit card fraud) 18 U.S.C. §§
1461, 1462 (interstate transportation of obscene materials);
18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2251(e), 2252(b) (sexual abuse of
child and child pornography); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 843(b),
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848 (drug offenses). All provide for sentence bumps based
upon prior convictions.
91 See Almendarez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. 224, 247 (1998)
(upholding 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (1994) which, despite an
otherwise applicable statutory maximum of two years
imprisonment, authorizes a 20-year term of imprisonment
for alien reentry if a judge determines that the initial
deportation was for commission of an aggravated felony).
95
Harris v. U.S., 536 U.S. 545, 563 (2002) (plurality opinion).
Neal v. U.S., 516 U.S. 284 (1996) (mandatory minimum
sentence for LSD trumps the lower guideline sentence).
97 For example, under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), 50 grams or more of
cocaine base provides a mandatory minimum sentence of
10 years; under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines manual §
2(d)(1.1)(4), 50 grams of cocaine base likewise provides a
level 32 which translates to 121-151 months.
See Comey memo, supra note 14.
See generally Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apprendi and
Plea Bargaining, 54 STAN. L. REV.295, 296 (2001) (arguing
that prosecutorial bargaining chips were transferred to
criminal defendants post- Apprendi).
soo The Thornburg memo is reprinted in 6 FED.SENT. REP. 347
(1994), and moderated by the 1993 Reno Memorandum,
reprinted in 6 FEO.SENT. REP. 352 (1994). The Ashcroft
version can be found at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm (prohibiting line
prosecutors from making deals involving charge or
sentencing bargaining, except as authorized). See also
United States Attorneys' Manual, § 9-27.400 (2002).
101 Once a prosecutor alleges an enhancement in an
indictment, defense pleas of guilt to a lesser offense will not
prevent retrial on the "greater offense" of the charged
offense plus the sentencing aggravators. See Jeffers v. U.S.,
432 U.S. 137, 152 (1977) (defendant waives double
jeopardy claim by requesting severance of charges); Ohio v.
Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984), infra note 131.
102
See e.g. U.S. v. Croxford, 2004 WL 1521560 *19 (D. Utah
July 7, 2004); U.S. v. Rucker, supra n. 60. See also Booker,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14223 (advising judge on remand to
sentence in the alternative); Penny Roberts, Sentencing
Guidelines in Question, http://www.2theadvocate.com (July
11, 2004) (noting local case in which judge sentenced in
alternative).
103
See e.g. U.S. v. Shamblin, 2004 WL 1468561 (S.D.W. Va.,
June 30, 2004) (correcting "obvious" mistake in sentencing
and reducing sentence under Blakely). See also U.S. v. De La
Torre, 327 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2003) (reviewing sentence
following district court's decision to grant motion for
correction of sentence under Rule 35 to correct Apprendi
error).
IN' See Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein,
Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 3 § 585.2 (Criminal 3d
ed., 2004) (collecting cases).
105 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2541 (noting governments are "free to
seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the
defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents
to judicial factfinding." and that "[e]ven a defendant who
stands trial may consent to judicial factfinding as to
sentence enhancements").
IM See, e.g., U.S. v. Martinez, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 793 (2d Cir.
Jan. 20, 2004) (rejecting Apprendi claim, finding that the
defendant expressly waived his right to appeal any sentence
between 87 and 108 months in the plea agreement); U.S. v.
Daniels, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 561 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 2003)
(waiver barred Apprendi claim). But see U.S. v. General, 278
F.3d 389, 399 n. 4 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that the
government conceded that defendant's appeal waiver did
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not bar challenges to defendant's sentence pursuant to
Apprendi or on account of his lack of competency, since both
were "challenges that are not subject to contractual
waivers"), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1064 (2003).
See e.g. U.S. v. Hollins, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 8766 (5th Cir.

,

May 4, 2004) (unpublished) (collecting cases finding that a
waiver of rights under § 2255 or rights to appeal do not
preclude review of sentence that exceeds the statutory
maximum); U.S. v. General, 278 F.3d 389, supra,
note 106.
Consider for example the waiver provision in U.S. v.
Shimoda, 334 F.3d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis
added):
Defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal, except as
indicated in subparagraph "b" below, any sentence within the
maximum provided in the statute(s) of conviction or the manner
in which that sentence was determined on any of the grounds
set forth in Section 3742, or on any ground whatever, in
exchange for the concessions made by the prosecution in
this plea agreement .... b. If the Court in imposing sentence
departs (as that term is used in Part K of the Sentencing
Guidelines) upward from the guideline range determined by
the Court to be applicable to the Defendant, the Defendant
retains the right to appeal the upward departure portion of
his sentence and the manner in which that portion was
determined under Section 3742 and to challenge that
portion of his sentence in a collateral attack."

Probably this provision would be construed to bar all but
Part K departures, so long as the sentence was within the
maximum sentence provided in the statute defining the
offense of conviction, not the maximum sentence provided
in the Guidelines absent additional facts. Interestingly, the
Court in Shimoda, a pre-Blakely case, rejected Shimoda's
Apprendi claim, which was based on his "argument that the
term 'statute(s) of conviction,' as used in the plea
agreement, includes the federal sentencing guidelines." Id.
at 850.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Amsden, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 22567 at *4
(2d Cir. Oct. 29, 2002) (rejecting Apprendi claim due to
appeal waiver, stating "the plea agreement in the instant
case stipulated an anticipated sentencing range, and
explicitly waived any right the defendant might otherwise
have had to appeal his sentence so long as that sentence fell
within, or below, the stipulated range, and did so regardless
of the method by which the district court reached that
sentence").
.10 See, e.g., Shimoda, supra note 108.
See, e.g., Memo. from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to all
federal prosecutors, Department Principles for Implementing
an Expedited Disposition or "Fast-Track" Prosecution Program
in a District, (Sept. 23, 2003) (requiring that cases include
appeal waivers, but waivers that expressly exempt only
ineffective assistance claims) (reprinted in 16 FED. SENT.
REP. 135 (2003)); U.S. v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187
(10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a "plea agreement waiver of
post-conviction rights does not waive the right to bring a
[habeas] petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel
claims challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver");
U.S. v. Henderson, 72 F.3d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1995) ("We
agree ... that dismissal of an appeal based on a waiver in
the plea agreement is inappropriate where the defendant's
motion to withdraw the plea incorporates a claim that the
plea agreement generally, and the defendant's waiver of
appeal specifically, were tainted by ineffective assistance of
counsel.").
535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) (citations and internal quotes
omitted).
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Johnson v. U.S., 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997) ("Where the law
at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the
law at the time of appeal[,] it is [enough] that [an] error be
plain at the time of appellate consideration").
U.S. v. Dominguez-Benitez, 124 S. Ct. 2333 (2004); U.S. v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (error must have affected the
outcome of the district court proceedings).
See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633-34 ("Indeed, the fairness and
integrity of the criminal justice system depends on meting
out to those inflicting the greatest harm on society the most
severe punishments. The real threat then to the 'fairness,
integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings'
would be if respondents, despite the overwhelming and
uncontroverted evidence that they were involved in a vast
drug conspiracy, were to receive a sentence prescribed for
those committing less substantial drug offenses because of
an error that was never objected to at trial.").
The Court in Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1 (1999), held that

omitting an element entirely from jury instructions can be
harmless error, and after Apprendi lower courts extended
Neder to facts that should have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury. Cotton also suggests Apprendi
and Blakely error can be harmless.
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523 U.S. 224 (1998), see also supra note 39.
718
See U.S. v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 285-86 (5th Cir. 2004)
(collecting authority, and noting, "although Cotton dealt only
with plain error and expressly reserved the question whether
a defect in an indictment is structural error, the Court's
analysis suggests strongly that such a defect is not the sort
of structural error that necessarily escapes harmless error
review").
19
See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), and
related cases, discussed in Wayne La Fave, Jerold Israel &
Nancy King, Criminal Procedure vol. 5, § 26.8 (2d ed. 2000 &
Supp.) (Westlaw database CRIMPROC).
in 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
121 E.g. Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28 (1985). See
also U.S. v. Ameline, No. 02-30326 (9th Cir. July 21,
2004) (finding defendant's challenge to his sentence on
appeal allowed to remand for resentencing with sentencing
jury).
122
Burks v. U.S., 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Green v. U.S., 355 U.S. 184
(1957).
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See Ball v. U.S., 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
I2
State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 931 (Ariz. 2003).
125
State v. Lovelace, 90 P.3d 298, 301-02 (Idaho 2004)
("Because the sentencing judge concluded there was
sufficient evidence to find three aggravating circumstances
to support imposition of the death sentence, Lovelace
cannot claim that he was acquitted of the greater offense of
'first-degree murder plus aggravating circumstances.'
... [T]he findings of the sentencing judge do not establish
that the government failed to prove one or more aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, as they would,
had the original findings been in favor of a sentence less
than death. The double jeopardy protection, which bars a
second prosecution on the same offense after an acquittal,
is thus not implicated.").
126
See e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (2004) ("The Commission ...
shall promulgate and distribute to all courts ... guidelines
...for use of a sentencing court in determining the
sentence to be imposed in a criminal case."); Fed. R. Crim.
P. 32(i) (assuming court, not jury, would resolve issues
under the Guidelines at sentencing).
127 Cf. U.S. v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 638, 647 (8th Cir. 2003) ("The
district court was not required to submit the principal
organizer and drug quantity special interrogatories to the
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jury. However, we find no error with this cautious approach
as well as the district court's agreement with the jury's
factual findings.").
For an example of such instructions, see U.S. v. Medas,
2004 U.,S. Dist. LEXIS 12135 (E.D.N.Y July 1, 2004).
Singer v. U.S., 380 U.S. 24 (1965); Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a).
Cotton did not suggest that the government could reopen

proof on the omitted element; instead, the government had
the opportunity to show to the reviewing court that given the
evidence that was submitted below, curing the error would
have made no difference in the outcome. Cotton, however,
was a case where the omission of the element was harmless;
the Court did not address the remedy if the omission had
not been harmless.
131 See U.S. v. Booker, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14223 at *17 (7th
Cir. July 9, 2004) (observing that reindictment at the
remand stage would "present a double-jeopardy issue," but
declining to address that issue). Assuming the government
did not object to a defendant's guilty plea in the trial court,
we note that the government will not be able to argue that
the defendant has waived his right to a prosecution on the
greater offense by pleading guilty to the lesser, the situation
in Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984). See also cases
collected in Wayne La Fave, Jerold Israel, & Nancy King,
Criminal Procedure vol. 5, § 25.4(d) nn. 45-47 (2d ed. 1999
& Supp.) (Westlaw database CRIMPROC).
132 See Schriro v. Summerlin, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 4574 at *8
(2004) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, (1989), and
holding that the rule requiring jury determination of
aggravating facts in Ring could not be applied retroactively
to Summerlin's case, because the rule was "new" and did
not fit within an exception to the bar against retroactive
application of new rules on collateral review. Summerlin's
direct appeal ended well before the date the Court decided
Apprendi v. New Jersey).
See Beard v. Banks, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 4572 at *15 (quoting
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527 (1997), finding that
the rule in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), could not
be applied retroactively to Bank's case, because it was not
dictated by precedent in 1987 when Bank's direct appeal
concluded, and did not fit within an exception to the bar
against retroactive application of new rules on collateral
review).
Supra n. 132.
See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (overruling, in part,
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)). In several prior
decisions, the Court has endorsed judicial findings for facts
triggering higher ranges under the Guidelines. See Edwards
v. U.S., 523 U.S. 511, 514-15 (1998); Witte v. U.S., 515
U.S. 389, 399-401 (1995); U.S. v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148,
156-57 (1997) (per curiam). Thus, a later decision applying
Blakely to the Federal Guidelines may, like Ring, require the
Court to reject earlier precedent.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 501-02 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); id. at 543-545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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See also Shamblin, 2004 WL 1468561 at *8, (stating Blakely
"flowed naturally from Apprendi and its progeny").
08
Consider, for example, the following dicta in McNair v.
Campbell, 307 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (M.D. Ala. 2004), cert.
denied, McNair v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 1159, 1343 (2004):
It is worth pointing out that, for some petitioners, Ring is
arguably not a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure.
Imagine a hypothetical habeas petitioner whose conviction
became final between the time when the Supreme Court
decided Apprendi and the time it decided Ring. .. . [If] the
outcome in Ring was dictated by Apprendi.... our
hypothetical petitioner could arguably rely on Ring because it
was dictated by Apprendi, "precedent existing at the time
[the petitioner's] conviction became final," Teague, 489 U.S.
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at 301, 109 S. Ct. at 1070. At the same time, however, there
is a good argument that even for our hypothetical petitioner,
Ring would still be considered a new rule. The Supreme
Court has written that "there can be no dispute that a
decision announces a new rule if it expressly overrules a prior
decision." Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467, 113 S. Ct.
892, 897, 122 L. Ed. 2d (1993). On this reasoning, Ring is
new for purposes of Teague because it overruled Walton,
notwithstanding that Ring appears to be an application of
Apprendi.
See also Besser v. Walsh, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21474
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (although Ring was new vis a vis Apprendi
for death cases, Ring's overruling of Walton did not
automatically render Ring's holding a "new rule" as to the
non-capital case at bar).
139
See Ring, 536 U.S. at 601.
140 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 603-04 (rejecting state's argument
that the statute specifying "death or life imprisonment" as
the only sentencing options meant that the statutory range
authorized by the jury verdict was death, noting "This
argument overlooks Apprendi's instruction that 'the relevant
inquiry is one not of form, but of effect.' ... In effect, 'the
required finding [of an aggravated circumstance] expose[d]
[Ring] to a greater punishment than that authorized by the
jury's guilty verdict."')
141 See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 393-95 (1994)
(after "[concluding] that a reasonable jurist reviewing [the
Supreme Court's] precedents at the time [the] conviction
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application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to a noncapital
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the experience of the lower courts" and also stated "in the
Teague analysis the reasonable views of state courts are
entitled to consideration along with those of federal
courts"); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 538 (1997)
(considering lower federal court and state court decisions in
Teague "new rule" analysis).
142
U.S. v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2001) (Tjoflat,
C.J., concurring) ("It is obvious from the start that there is
no Apprendi error in this case. Because the Sanchezes'
sentences did not exceed the twenty-year maximum
sentence prescribed by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), Apprendi
simply does not apply."). For additional authority rejecting
Apprendi challenges to the Guidelines, see e.g. U.S. v. Casas,
356 F.3d 104, 128 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
Segui-Rodriguez v. U.S., 124 S. Ct. 2405 (2004); U.S. v.
Luciano, 311 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
Parise v. U.S., 124 S. Ct. 1185 (2004); U.S. v. Parmelee, 319
F.3d 583, 592 (3d Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Cannady, 283 F.3d
641, 649 n.7 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 936
(2002); U.S. v. Floyd, 343 F.3d 363, 372 (5th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2190 (2004); U.S. v. Tarwater, 308
F.3d 494, 517 (6th Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Merritt, 361 F.3d
1005, 1015 (7th Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Banks, 340 F.3d 683,
684-65 (8th Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Ochao, 311 F.3d 1133,
1134-36 (9th Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d
1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1063
(2002); U.S. v. Ortiz, 318 F.3d 1030, 1039 (11th Cir. 2003);
U.S. v. Pettigrew, 346 F.3d 1139, 1147 n. 18 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
93
Consider our own assertions: "nothing in Apprendi changes
the government's ability to relitigate at sentencing any fact
that was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.
Even facts expressly rejected by a trial jury may be proven at
sentencing by a preponderance, and used by the judge to
set a sentence, so long as that sentence is within the
statutory maximum." Klein & King, Aprds Apprendi, supra note
36 (emphasis added).
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See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 158 (1997).
One might argue that the Teague retroactivity rules do not
even apply because Blakely was a rule of substantive law,
not procedural law. This argument failed in Summerlin when
made in connection with Ring, and it will fail with Blakely for
the same reasons.
1,6 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n. 4 ("Ring's claim is tightly
delineated: He contends only that the Sixth Amendment
required jury findings on the aggravating circumstances
asserted against him").
147 Blakely and Beyond, A Memorandum for Panel Attorneys 9
(July 6, 2004) (copy available online at Sentencing Law and
Policy, Tuesday, July 06, 2004, NACDL's Blakely Analysis,
http://sentencing.typepad.com) (citing Ivan V. v. City of New
York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (In re Winship 1397 U.S. 358
(1970) retroactive)); Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S.
233 (1977) (Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1995)
retroactive)), see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
14 Cotton, 535 U.S. at 632-33.
149 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2004).
5o 121 S.Ct. 2478 (2001).
151 The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals denied a successive
petition on this basis in In Re Dean, decided July 9, 2004.
2004 WL 1534788 (11th Cir. July 9, 2003).
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Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2552-53 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
153 Id. at 2553.
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Kate Stith & William Stuntz, Sense and Sentencing, N.Y.
.
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TIMES, June 29, 2004, at A27.

155 See e.g. The American Bar Association's Justice Kennedy
Commission Final Report, issued June 23, 2004, which can
be accessed through the ABA website.
156
PROTECT Act, supra n. 19.
157
Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Letter from Jon M. Sands, Chair, Sentencing Guidelines
Committee of the Federal and Community Defenders, to the
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U.S. Sentencing Commission (July 9, 2004) (available at
http://sentencing.typepad.com).
159
Croxford, 2004 WL 1521560 at *21.
10 See OpEd piece co-authored by Steven L. Chanenson,
Professor of Law at Villanova, and State Representative
Frank Dermody, Democrat from Oakmont and Chairman of
the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. Steven L.
Chanenson & Frank Dermody, In Pennsylvania, Sentencing
Remains the Same, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 30, 2004,
at A19.
161
Bowman memo, supra note 52, at 17. The text of Bowman's
proposed bill to amend 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3742 and 28
U.S.C. § 994 can be accessed on http://sentencing.
typepad.com.
In addition to Bowman's proposal, Congress and the
Commission are entertaining such diverse proposals as
letting 100 flowers bloom in the district courts (Professors
Berman, Miller, Demleitner, and Wright, written testimony
submitted to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, July
13th, 2004); tripling each Guidelines range (Professor Mark
Osler, submitted to Sentencing Commission); and
converting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines into truly
"advisory" suggestions with no force of law
(Professors Stith
and Stuntz). These can all be accessed at sentencing.
typepad.com.
162
Justice Scalia joined the four dissenters from Blakely and
Apprendi - Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy,
Justice O'Connor, and Justice Breyer - to make up the
plurality in Harris. 536 U.S. 545 (2002). One of us believes
that since Justice Breyer concurred in Harris only because
he had not yet accepted Apprendi, there is the slight chance
that there may be enough votes to overrule. See Susan R.
Klein & Jordan Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal
Sentencing, 2002, SUPREME COURT REV.223, 255-61 (2003)
(suggesting that the Harris decision is best explained not by
its internal logic, but by fear of its application to
determinate sentencing regimes).
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